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ZONING FOR THE
ELDERLY AND FAMILY
RIGHTS*
INTRODUCTION
The decay of the nation's housing,' coupled with the continuing in-
crease in human longevity,2 has engendered a shortage of housing suitable
for occupancy by the elderly.3 As a result, while the earning power of the
elderly has been diminished by retirement and inflation,' substantial num-
* This article is a student work prepared by Ralph J. Libsohn, a member of the St. Thomas
More Institute for Legal Research.
' See generally 6 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 872.1[21 (rev. ed. 1977);
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, CURRENT AND FUTURE HOUSING NEEDS OF ELDERLY
PENNSYLVANIANS 2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ELDERLY PENNSYLVANIANS].
2 See, e.g., Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976),
wherein the court observed that the number of persons over the age of 65 is increasing both
numerically and "in relative proportion to the total population." Id. at 266, 364 A.2d at 1025,
(citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
POPULATION: UNITED STATES SUMMARY 1-276 (1973)). The Weymouth court noted that nation-
ally, the elderly have increased from 12.3 million persons (8.2% of total population) in 1950
to 20 million (9.9% of total population) in 1970. Id. In New York State, there were approxi-
mately 1.25 million persons aged 65 or over in 1950 (8.5% of total population). By 1970, the
number of elderly individuals had increased to almost 2 million, comprising 10.8% of the
state's population. 1 NEW YORK STATE OMCE FOR THE AGING, FACTS & IDEAS ABOUT OLDER
PERSONS IN NEW YoRK STATE 9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FACTS & IDEAS]. See also ELDERLY
PENNSYLVANIANS, supra note 1, at 15.
' In 1971, federal officials determined that there existed a need for 120,000 new units of
housing for the elderly each year. See Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249,
272, 364 A.2d 1016, 1029 (1976) (citing 2 WHITE HousE CONFERENCE ON AGING, TOWARD A
NATIONAL POLICY ON AGING 32 (1971)). A recent Pennsylvania study projected an annual need
for nearly 16,000 new units of housing for elderly Pennsylvanians. See ELDERLY
PENNSYLVANIANS, supra note 1, at 33. See also DIvISION ON AGING, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, PUBLIC HOUSING FOR THE ELDERLY-UNrrS AND WAITING LIST 3 (1971).
, See Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 268, 364 A.2d 1016, 1026 (1976)
(citing NEW JERSEY OFCE ON AGING, DETAILED HOUSING AND INCOME INFORMATION ON THE
ELDERLY OF NEW JERSEY 2 (1973)), where the court noted that in 1970, 82.3% of New Jersey
households with elderly persons had yearly incomes less than $10,000, and 62.1% had incomes
less than $5,000. In comparison, median yearly incomes for New Jersey households generally
were almost $11,500. Id.
One commentator has noted that as "galloping inflation and accelerated taxation" have
forced the majority of citizens to live from presently earned income, the ability to save for
old age has been greatly diminished. Alexander, Symposium-Law & The Aged-Foreword:
Life, Liberty, and Property Rights for the Elderly, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 267, 268 (1975). Thus,
many senior citizens are being "catapulted into [a] world ... of poverty, food stamps,
welfare payments, . . . obtrusive social workers, and often institutionalization." Id.
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bers of these citizens have been compelled to reside in living quarters that
are either substandard, 5 unsuited to their needs' or, at worst, pose potential
hazards to their welfare.' Increasingly, as part of their programs to provide
adequate housing for the aged,' municipalities have enacted senior citizen
zoning ordinances which establish minimum age requirements for access
to housing.9
Reflecting concern for the well-being of the elderly, these ordinances
have been designed to encourage construction of residences attuned to the
physical and psychological needs of these citizens.10 Thus, although the
typical ordinance restricts occupancy of residential units to one individual
aged 55 or over, zoning provisions often permit a spouse of any age and one
adult offspring to live with the occupant." Nevertheless, such ordinances
have not been uniformly well received, and their legality has been chal-
lenged, unsuccessfully, under several theories. 2 On the basis of recently
See NEW JERSEY OFFICE ON AGING, DETAILED HOUSING AND INCOME INFORMATION ON THE ELD-
ERLY OFNEW JERSEY 2 (1973). It has been noted that in New York "in 1960, 131,000 households
with heads 65 years of age or older (13.4% of all such households) lived in dilapidated or
deteriorated housing." DIvISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL, NEW YORK STATE
HOUSING PROGRAMS FOR THE AGING 1 (1970).
' See, e.g., 2 FACTS AND IDEAS, supra note 2, at 11-13, where findings revealed that some elderly
residents may be required to climb several flights of stairs to enter their living quarters; some
live in "blighted" areas surrounded by factories and commercial facilities; some reside in
crowded apartments or in inconveniently large units; others live in areas far away from
essential medical facilities. Id.
7 See id.
See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 18, § 1; N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1976). See
generally OFFICE ON AGING, DIVISION OF HUMAN RESOURCES, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MUNITY AFFAIRS, A COMMUNITY GUIDE: HOUSING NEW JERSEY'S ELDERLY 13; DIVISION OF HOUSING
AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL, NEW YORK STATE HOUSING PROGRAMS FOR THE AGING (1970).
See notes 11 & 83 infra.
10 See Campbell v. Barraud, 58 App. Div. 2d 270, 272, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (2d Dep't 1977).
See, e.g., Manalapan, N.J., Amendment to Zoning Ordinance no. 1, art. V (August 1970),
which provides:
One or more contiguous parcels of land having a total land area of 75 or more acres
under common ownership or control which is planned for development with residential
dwelling units and other structures and facilities designed to be occupied and used by
and for single individuals 52 years of age or over; married couples at least one of whom
is 52 years of age or over; two closely related persons, e.g., sisters, brothers, brother
and sister, aunt and niece, parent and child, etc., when both persons are 52 years of
age or older; or two unrelated persons of the same sex when both are 52 years of age or
older; one person over 19 years of age may reside in a dwelling unit with an elderly
person or persons, as permitted above, if the presence of such person is essential for
the physical care or economic support of the elderly person or persons; children 19 years
of age or older may reside with a parent or parents.
Cf. Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 234, 364 A.2d 1005,
1008 (1976) (citing the town's senior citizen zoning ordinance).
" See, e.g., Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976)
(ordinance challenged as violative of equal protection clause, ultra vires, and exclusionary);
Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976)
(ordinance challenged as violative of equal protection clause, ultra vires, and exclusionary);
Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
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evolving principles of constitutional law, however, it is yet possible that
some of these zoning schemes will eventually fail as unlawful intrusions
upon the family rights of senior citizens residing within zoned subdivisions.
The questioned legal effect of zoning for the elderly can be illustrated
by the following hypothetical: An elderly widow is an occupant of a housing
complex situated on property zoned for senior citizen use. Upon the death
of the resident's daughter-in-law, the occupant's son and grandson come
to live with her in the zoned community. This arrangement enables the Son
to retain his job, while the occupant tends to her grandchild's needs. More-
over, the arrangement also serves the occupant, affording her the compan-
ionship of a family while she remains within a community designed to suit
her physical needs. The arrangement, however, does not comport with the
town zoning ordinance which permits only one adult offspring to reside
with the elderly resident. Therefore, the occupant receives a notice of
violation from the town, stating that her grandchild is an illegal occupant,
and directing her to comply with the ordinance. Having failed to do so, the
occupant is subject to criminal conviction, and a jail sentence or fine.
The following discussion will focus on two questions presented by the
preceding hypothetical case: Does the ordinance touch upon an area of
constitutionally protected family rights by circumscribing the right of the
elderly to share a household with their progeny? If it does, may a state be
precluded from enforcing such an ordinance?
Moore v. City of East Cleveland
Although the constitution does not contain specific provisions safe-
guarding familial relationships, the Supreme Court has recognized that
some interests inherent in family life do warrant constitutional protec-
tion." In Meyer v. Nebraska," the Court declared that an individual's
993 (1975) (ordinance challenged as violative of equal protection clause, ultra vires, and
exclusionary); Bailey v. Board of Appeals, 345 N.E.2d 367 (Mass. 1976) (claim that failure
to hold public hearing and file environmental impact report invalidated ordinance).
Equal protection challenges to senior citizen zones have not been well received by the
courts. Since age is not considered a suspect classification, see, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (mandatory retirement age does not contravene
equal protection clause); Ramirez v. Weinberger, 415 U.S. 970 (1974), aff'g mem. 363 F.Supp.
105 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (age limitation for receipt of welfare benefits permissible under fourteenth
amendment); Human Rights Party v. Secretary of State, 414 U.S. 1058, aff'g mem. 370 F.
Supp. 921 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (minimum age to hold public office permissible); Gaunt v.
Brown, 409 U.S. 809, aff'g mer. 341 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (minimum voting age
does not conflict with equal protection clause); cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race
a suspect classification); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage a suspect
classification); nor housing a fundamental right, see, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,
74 (1972); courts have employed a rational basis test in upholding the validity of senior citizen
zoning ordinances. See, e.g., Campbell v. Barraud, 58 App. Div. 2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909
(1977); cf. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (racially restrictive ordinance unconstitu-
tional infringement of property owners' rights).
13 See note 15 infra.
4 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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rights to "marry, establish a home and bring up children" are protected
under the fourteenth amendment.'5 Later, in Poe v. Ullman," Justice Har-
lan stated that "[tihe home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family
life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has
been found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explic-
itly granted Constitutional right."'7 More recently, in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, the Court, in a four-justice plurality opinion, expressed appro-
bation of the thrust of Meyer and its progeny, apparently extending the
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."'"
Moore involved the criminal conviction of a property owner for viola-
tion of a local zoning ordinance. The ordinance, purportedly enacted to
prevent overcrowding, traffic congestion, and overburdening of the local
school system,2° permitted only certain combinations of blood relatives to
reside within a single-family dwelling unit.2' As a consequence, the ordi-
"1 Id. at 399. Later Courts have recognized the right to marry, see, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail,
98 S. Ct. 673, 681 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1976); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), the right to establish a home, see, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 15 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 384 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (state
cannot chill indigent's right to travel interstate and establish new residence); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (state anti-obscenity laws must respect privacy of one's
home), and the right to bring up children, see, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925). The Meyer Court stated:
The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the
guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or with-
out reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect.
Determination by the Legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power
is not final or conclusive, but is subject to supervision by the courts.
262 U.S. at 399-400. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 393 (1926).
*I 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
*7 Id. at 551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
* 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
' 431 U.S. at 499-500.
2' The East Cleveland ordinance provided that:
"Family" means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the
household or to the spouse of the nominal head of the household living as a single
housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to the following:
"(a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household.
"(b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of
the nominal head of the household, provided, however, that such unmarried children
have no children residing with them.
"(c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of
the nominal head of the household.
"(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family may in-
clude not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal head
of the household and the spouse and dependent children of such dependent child. For
the purpose of this subsection, a dependent person is one who has more than fifty
percent of his total support furnished for him by the nominal head of the household
and the spouse of the nominal head of the household.
"(e) A family may consist of one individual."
431 U.S. at 496 n.12 (quoting EAST CLEVELAND, OHIO CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1341.08).
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nance operated to preclude the appellant grandmother, Mrs. Moore, from
residing with one of her parentless grandchildren. 2 Forced by exigent cir-
cumstances to maintain this illegal living arrangement," Mrs. Moore was
convicted of violating the ordinance. She appealed from this conviction,
challenging East Cleveland's ordinance as an impermissible infringement
on her family rights. 4
The City of East Cleveland contended, however, that pursuant to the
decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,15 it was permissible for a
municipality to promote effective land use regulation by delineating the
class of individuals who could reside in single family dwellings. In Belle
Terre, the challenged ordinance defined "family" to include persons re-
lated by blood, marriage, or adoption, and forbade occupancy of single
family residences by any group comprised of three or more unrelated indi-
viduals.2 6 Several college students living near their university in violation
of the ordinance challenged the regulation.27 Although the ordinance ap-
parently regulated the lifestyles of residents directly, 28 and only indirectly
regulated the land involved, '9 the Supreme Court applied the standard of
review3 " traditionally employed in evaluating land use ordinances and sus-
2 431 U.S. at 497. See note 23 infra.
21 Mrs. Moore lived with her son and two grandchildren, who were first cousins. Id. at 496.
One of the grandchildren, John Moore, Jr., moved in with Mrs. Moore upon the death of his
mother. Id. at 497. Under the statutory section defining permissible family units, see note 21
supra, John was an "illegal occupant." 431 U.S. at 497. Thereafter, Mrs. Moore received a
notice of violation from the city and, when she refused to comply with the ordinance or seek
a variance, the city filed a criminal charge. Id. At trial, Mrs. Moore claimed the ordinance
was unconstitutional on its face, a contention that was rejected by the trial court and the
Ohio appellate courts. Id.
24 Id. at 497-98.
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
' Id. at 2.
The students contended that the ordinance interfered with one's rights to travel and relo-
cate, privacy, and that the ordinance "reek[ed] with an animosity to unmarried couples who
live together." Id. at 7-8.
28 Id. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), is the leading case in the area of zoning
review. Euclid involved a comprehensive zoning ordinance enacted by a suburban com-
munity. Id. at 379-80. The ordinance was challenged on the grounds that it deprived the
plaintiff-landowner of his property without due process of law and denied him equal protec-
tion. Id. at 384. The landowner contended that his tract of land, rezoned for residential use,
had been reduced greatly in market value, since industrial use of the undeveloped plot had
been precluded by the ordinance. Id. Dismissing his complaint, the Court held that the
exclusion of industrial buildings from residential areas bore a rational relation to the health
and safety of the community, which was a legitimate concern of the local government. Id. at
391.
A different result was reached in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the
next zoning case to be decided by the Court. In Nectow, the plaintiffs contentions were
examined by a master, who found that the districting of the plaintiff's parcel of land did not
"promote the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of that part
of the defendant City . . . ." Id. at 187. Agreeing that "a court should not set aside the
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tained the regulation as bearing a substantial relation to permissible state
objectives."
In Moore, the City maintained that since a state may properly invoke
its police powers in order to alleviate congestion and overcrowding, its
ordinance should be sustained.2 The Court, in a plurality opinion authored
by Justice Powell, reversed the conviction. Three dissenting justices, how-
ever, agreed with the City's contentionsn3 while Justice Stevens, who con-
curred with the plurality in the judgment, did so on the ground that the
ordinance failed the traditional substantial relation standard of review .3
determination of public officers" in zoning matters, id., the Court held it was bound by the
master's report declaring that the ordinance bore no "substantial relation" to the public
welfare. Id. at 188.
416 U.S. at 9.
3 See 431 U.S. at 499-500.
3 Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and White dissented. Analyzing the impact of Belle Terre,
Justice Stewart stated:
The present case brings before us a similar ordinance of East Cleveland, Ohio, one
that also limits the occupancy of any dwelling unit to a single family, but one that
defines "family" to include only certain combinations of blood relatives. The question
presented, as I view it, is whether the decision in Belle Terre is controlling, or whether
the Constitution compels a different result because East Cleveland's definition of
"family" is more restrictive than that before us in the Belle Terre case.
Id. at 532. Chief Justice Burger dissented on other grounds and did not reach the issue. Id.
at 521.
It is interesting to note that ordinances like the one in Belle Terre had met with wide-
spread condemnation in the past. See id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring); see, e.g., Neptune
Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d 687 (1951); City of Des Plaines v. Trottner,
34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J.
241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971); Missionaries of Our Lady v. Whitefish Bay, 267 Wisc. 609, 66
N.W.2d 627 (1954). In City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 304-05, 313 N.E.2d
756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (1974), the New York Court of Appeals attempted to harmo-
nize Belle Terre with this authority by noting that the living arrangement prohibited in
Belle Terre lacked the permanency that characterizes residential neighborhoods, and that
an ordinance may properly emphasize and ensure the character of such neighborhoods "to
promote the family environment." Id. at 305, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452. The
Ferraioli court held that inasmuch as the defendant, a state sponsored group home for foster
children, was "not a framework for transients or transient living," it did not conflict with the
ordinance. Id. at 306, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453. In Belle Terre, however, was
Justice Douglas careful to note that the ordinance did not affect transients, 416 U.S. at 7,
for such an ordinance might be held invalid under Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(residency requirement for receipt of welfare held to unconstitutionally impinge on funda-
mental right to travel).
1 In his pragmatic concurring opinion, see 431 U.S. at 513-21, Justice Stevens applied the
rule of Belle Terre to the instant case. Turning to the statute's unique definitional section,
see note 21 supra, Justice Stevens declared that the ordinance failed the substantial relation
test and "constitute[d] a taking of property without due process." 431 U.S. at 521 (Stevens,
J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated:
There appears to be no precedent for an ordinance which excludes any of an
owner's relatives from the group of persons who may occupy his residence on a perma-
nent basis. Nor does there appear to be any justification for such a restriction on an
owner's use of his property. . . .Since this ordinance has not been shown to have any
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Only the four justices joining in the plurality opinion, therefore, found
family rights to be involved in Moore.3 5 Those justices agreed that "[tihe
tradition of. . .grandparents sharing a household along with parents and
children has roots . . . deserving of constitutional recognition. '3
Justice Powell reasoned that Moore fell without the parameters of
Belle Terre, as the challenged ordinance in the latter case affected only
unrelated individuals. 3 Pointing out that the Belle Terre Court was
"careful to note that [the ordinance] promoted 'family needs' and 'family
values,'" Justice Powell stressed that East Cleveland's ordinance inhib-
ited family life.3 8 The Moore Court concluded therefore that "[wihen a
city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family," the traditional
deference accorded zoning regulations under the substantial relation test
does not apply.3 9 Instead, the Court subjected the ordinance to an intensi-
fied scrutiny, "examin[ing] carefully the importance of the governmental
interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the chal-
lenged regulation."' 0 Finding that the language of the ordinance did not
effectively further the interests of the state, the plurality opinion thus held
that the regulation constituted an unwarranted intrusion into a protected
area of family rights."
In his dissent, Justice Stewart declared that Belle Terre should gov-
ern,4" and that "[tihe interest that the appellant may have in [residing]
with some of her relatives does not rise to [a constitutionally protected]
level.' 3 Disagreeing with the Court, which declined to cut off family rights
"substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare" ... and
since it cuts so deeply into a fundamental right normally associated with the ownership
of residential property-that of an owner to decide who may reside on his or her
property-it must fall ....
Id. at 520-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
11 Id. at 521. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joined in Justice Powell's opinion.
31 Id. at 504 (footnote omitted).
17 Id. at 498.
31 Id. In Belle Terre, Justice Douglas stated:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This goal is a
permissible one within Berman v. Parker .... The police power is not confined to
elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people.
416 U.S. at 9. The ordinance challenged in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) provided
for slum clearance in the District of Columbia. The Court held that the concept of public
welfare that may be enhanced by zoning regulations is broad and inclusive, id. at 33, and
that "[it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled." Id.
31 431 U.S. at 499.
40 Id.
1 Id. at 506. It is important to note that the Court made no finding in fact that the ordinance
failed to serve the public interest.
2 Id. at 534 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
, Id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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at the "arbitrary boundary" of the nuclear family, 4 Justice Stewart stated
that "[tlo equate this interest with the fundamental decisions to marry
and to bear and raise children is to extend the limited substantive contours
of the Due Process Clause beyond recognition."'' 5 Disputing this point in a
separate opinion, Justice Brennan, who also joined in the plurality opinion,
conceded that the nuclear family arrangement is a commonly employed
pattern of living." Nonetheless, Justice Brennan concluded that the ex-
tended family, where several generations of family members reside in a
single household, "remains a vital tenet of our society" also deserving
constitutional protection.'4
In prior decisions where family privacy rights were at issue,'8 the Court
"has not tolerated even a low degree of state meddling."' 49 It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the intrusive ordinance challenged in Moore, which
regulated the living choices of parents, would be struck down. While prior
authority offered little indication whether the Court's vigilance would ex-
tend beyond protection of parental prerogatives,"0 the direction chosen by
the plurality in its expansion of familial rights is seemingly supported by
existing decisional law. In Palo Alto Tenants' Union v. Morgan,"1 a case
which antedated and correctly anticipated Belle Terre, a federal district
court in California compared the rights of members of traditional fami-
lies-individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption-with the rights
of "voluntary" family members, such as the unrelated residents of a com-
mune. Addressing plaintiff's claim that the Palo Alto ordinance excluding
communal groups from an "R-1" zone was violative of the equal protection
4 Id. at 494.
Id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 510 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47 Id.
' See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 623 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
,9 Comment, Neither Seen nor Heard: Keeping Children Out of Arizona's Adult Communi-
ties Under Arizona Revised Statutes Section 33-1317(B), 1975 ARIz. ST. L.J. 813, 823.
" Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), cited by the Moore plurality to support its
contention that family rights extend beyond the nuclear family, 431 U.S. at 505 n.15, dealt
with the relationship between aunt and niece. 321 U.S. at 159. The aunt, a Jehovah's Witness,
was convicted of violating the Massachusetts child labor law, by permitting her niece to sell
religious magazines on the street. Id. at 159-60. In affirming the conviction, the Court recog-
nized Mrs. Prince's "sacred" right to control the upbringing of the child, id. at 165, although
the appellant was the custodian, rather than the parent, of the minor involved. Id. at 159.
Not until Moore had the Court extended constitutional protection to those not parents or in
loco parentis; on the contrary, protection had been extended expressly to such parties alone.
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing of children).
" 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
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clause of the fourteenth amendment," the court stated that an ordinance
purporting to exclude traditional families from residential zones would be
greatly disfavored. The court went on to observe, however, that the long
recognized value in the traditional family relationship is not inherent in
the voluntary family.5 3 The traditional family, it was found, is a union
cemented by biological and legal ties. The family role in educating and
nourishing the young has been a means, for innumerable generations, of
satisfying the emotional and physical needs of human beings.54 Thus, al-
though "a zoning law which divided or totally excluded traditional families
would. . . be suspect, ' '55 the court concluded that communal groups share
few of the characteristics militating against the disruption of traditional
families."
Palo Alto and Moore, both of which express a distaste for the breaking
up of blood related families, differ only in regard to the intensity with
which such ordinances will be scrutinized. The Palo Alto court would
require a municipality to demonstrate a compelling interest to justify its
intrusion into the forbidden area;57 in contrast, Moore, if read literally,
demands only that a municipality establish the potential effectiveness of
its ordinance in attaining a permissible purpose." Moore does, however,
subject intrusive ordinances to a far more stringent standard of review than
that established by Belle Terre. It is therefore significant that the Moore
plurality, while agreeing with Justice Stevens' contention that East Cleve-
land's ordinance failed to survive even a minimum level of constitutional
scrutiny,5" felt compelled to go beyond this rationale in order to afford
greater protection to the family.
THE IMPACT OF Moore ON ZONING FOR THE ELDERLY
By examining the potential effectiveness of the challenged ordinance,
the Moore Court appears to have entered into an area normally reserved
for legislative judgment.60 The Moore standard, therefore, seems inconsist-
2 321 F. Supp. at 911.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. (emphasis added).
'Id.
' See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673, 679 (1978); San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 28, 32-33 (1973).
" See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra. In actuality, the Court appeared to use an equal
protection analysis in this substantive due process case. The Court found the ordinance both
underinclusive and overinclusive, and struck it down on that basis. See note 59 infra.
" The Court found that the definitional section of the ordinance, see note 21 supra, bore "but
a tenuous relation" to the alleviation of overcrowding, traffic and parking congestion and
school overcrowding. 431 U.S. at 500. Noting several anomalies in the East Cleveland ordi.
nance, the Court stated that any family fitting the city's definition could reside within a
housekeeping unit, even if the family contained many licensed drivers. Id. Furthermore, the
ordinance would permit a grandmother to live with one dependent son and his children, even
if the children numbered a dozen. Id.
' See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
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ent with prior decisions concerning the reviewability of typical zoning laws.
In Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma,"' for instance,
the Ninth Circuit applied the traditional standard of review in upholding
a zoning ordinance in the face of the plaintiff's substantive due process
challenge,"2 emphasizing that "[tihe reasonableness, not the wisdom, of
the [ordinance] is at issue in this suit."6 In contrast, when a statute
impinges on a "fundamental right," the scope of legislative discretion is
restricted somewhat by the judiciary. In such a situation, the statute will
be upheld only if the state can demonstrate that the enactment is neces-
sary to promote a "compelling interest" which cannot be served by less
intrusive means. 64
The "less intrusive means" test comprises an efficacy test of sorts, but
is only invoked when fundamental rights are imperiled. 5 The Moore Court,
while treating Mrs. Moore's right as fundamental in nature, did not clearly
denominate them as such. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger has de-
scribed Moore as a case involving a "fundamental liberty" 6 and reiterated
that statutes impinging on such liberties are "subject to the most searching
kind of scrutiny, thus harmonizing""9 properly Moore with the Meyer line.
It appears, therefore, that grandparents have a fundamental right to live
with their linear descendants.
32 (1954); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975).
" 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
Id. at 909. The zoning plan challenged in Petaluma fixed the city's rate of growth and
created a "greenbelt" around the city. New housing starts were allocated to builders and
dispersed throughout sections of the city according to a complicated system. Id. at 901. The
purpose of the scheme, the city contended, was to insure the orderly development of the city,
id., and to protect its small town character, id. at 902. The Construction Industry Association
of Sonoma County challenged the plan as being arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore
violative of due process. Id. at 905. The association contended that the ordinance was an
exclusionary device designed to insulate the city from an expected influx of new residents.
Id. at 905. The ordinance was nevertheless sustained as bearing a rational relationship to a
permissible objective. Id. at 906-07 (footnote omitted).
0 Id. at 906. The court noted that, in examining the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance,
the fact that the ordinance has an exclusionary effect is not determinative; rather, the ques-
tion is whether the exclusion is reasonably related to a proper purpose. If no such relation
exists, the ordinance cannot stand. The court held, however, that if the ordinance is related
to a proper purpose, then the court "must defer to the legislative act. Being neither a super
legislature nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal court is without authority to weigh and
reappraise the factors considered or ignored by the legislative body in passing the challenged
zoning regulation." Id. See also Lighthouse Shores v. Town of Islip, 41 N.Y.2d 7, 359 N.E.2d
337, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1976).
1 Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673, 682 (1978) (restrictive marriage statute subjected to
rigorous scrutiny); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-38
(1973) (school district financing subject to strict scrutiny).
" See Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673, 681 (1978).
" 433 U.S. 425, 527 (1977).
11 Id. at 526. In Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978), a Wisconsin statute was held to
impermissibly interfere with plaintiff's right to marry. Id. at 681. Justice Marshall, writing
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Considered in the light of Justice Burger's pronouncement, Moore,
while not entirely dispositive of the questions posed in the introduction,
strongly suggests that both questions be answered in the affirmative.
Fundamental to the Moore decision is the notion that a municipality must
justify an intrusion into the protected area of family rights.70 Assuming
that senior citizen zoning ordinances will be subject to the same intensi-
fied probing exhibited in Moore, a showing by a municipality that an ordi-
nance can effectively serve an important state objective will be sufficient
to enable the statute in the hypothetical situation to withstand a sub-
stantive due process attack.7 Clearly, the state and its political sub-
divisions have a legitimate interest in providing the elderly with access to
suitable housing," and no court has ever ruled otherwise.73 The potential
effectiveness of senior citizen ordinances, however, is a more difficult issue
to resolve.
In Taxpayers' Association v. Weymouth Township," the Supreme
Court of New Jersey considered the potential efficacy of a local ordinance
permitting the creation of planned mobile home parks for the elderly in
an area where mobile home parks were generally excluded.75 The Court
found that such parks provided inexpensive, convenient and safe shelter
for the elderly and concluded that the challenged ordinance clearly pro-
moted the general welfare.76 The Weymouth case, however, involved an
for the Court, stated, "we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates
in any way to the incidents of marriage will be subjected to rigorous scrutiny." Id. The
challenged regulation was found to "directly and substantially" interfere with such rights,
however, and the more stringent standard was applied. Id. at 682. The Court also noted that
marriage rights "have been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to
• . . family relationships." Id. at 681.
"o See 431 U.S. at 499-500.
"' See id. at 499.
12 See, e.g., Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976);
Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 993 (1976). But cf. the dissent in Maldini, where it was argued that age was an irrelevant
consideration insofar as zoning is concerned, and that such a classification "clearly favors a
class without any apparent justification in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 36 N.Y.2d at 490, 330 N.E.2d at 409, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 393 (Jasen,
J., dissenting). See In re Central Management Co. v. Town Bd. of Oyster Bay, 47 Misc. 2d
385, 387, 262 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), aff'd, 24 App. Div. 2d 881, 204
N.Y.S.2d 1011 (2d Dep't 1965).
" But cf. Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm., 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (C.P.
1965) wherein the court suggested that there was no evidence that the citizens of the rural
town of Southbury required such an ordinance, and concluded that "[tihe welfare of aged
people undoubtedly is a matter of concern to the state and federal government, but it is not
ordinarily a matter of local government concern and, certainly not in towns the size of
Southbury." Id. at 129, 214 A.2d at 134 (dictum).
" 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976).
" Id. at 259, 364 A.2d at 1021.
7 Id. at 274, 364 A.2d at 1030.
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inclusionary ordinance, rather than an exclusionary one," and therefore
does not support the proposition that the exclusion of an elderly occupant's
younger relatives from a zoned subdivision effectively promotes important
state interests.
78
Recently, in Campbell v. Barraud,79 New York's Appellate Division,
Second Department, held that such an exclusion served a legitimate inter-
est of the state by ensuring that senior citizen housing will be available to
those for whom it has been constructed.80 The Campbell court stated that
"[iut is illogical to encourage the construction of housing geared to the
specialized needs of the elderly and then prohibit its exclusive use by such
group.""1 The court concluded that "it is essential to the achievement of
the purpose of the planned retirement community ordinance . . that the
population group intended to be served be specifically defined and granted
exclusive user status."" An examination of senior citizen zoning schemes,
however, suggests that the assessment of the Campbell court is questiona-
ble. Many such ordinances expressly permit limited occupancy of dwelling
units by individuals younger than the prescribed age, apparently without
fear that the legislative purpose will be thwarted. Many ordinances, for
example, provide that one adult child may reside with a senior citizen;
s3
in addition, the spouse of the senior citizen is not usually subject to the
age restriction . 4 Indeed, a municipality enacting a typical ordinance might
" Id. at 294, 364 A.2d at 1040.
7s The Weymouth court noted that "zoning may not be used to regulate family life," id. at
276, 364 A.2d at 1031 (citing Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281
A.2d 513 (1971)), "or to prevent whole classes of people from residing within a community,"
71 N.J. at 276-77, 364 A.2d at 1031 (citing Molino v. Mayor & Council, 116 N.J. Super. 195,
281 A.2d 401 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (limitation on apartment sizes in order to exclude
families with children)).
7' 58 App. Div. 2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (2d Dep't 1977).
o Id. at 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
1 Id.
'3 Id. The court also noted that the ordinance was not violative of New York's Human Rights
Law. Id., 394 N.Y.S.2d at 913. Although N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 291(2) (McKinney Supp. 1977)
provides that "[the opportunity to obtain ... the ownership, use and occupancy of housing
accommodations ... without discrimination because of age ... is hereby recognized as and
declared to be a civil right," the legislative intent behind this section was to specifically
exempt publicly assisted housing for the elderly. See Op. Arr'y GEN. (Nov. 6, 1975). Age
discrimination in such housing is therefore a proper exercise of power. See id. The Campbell
court extended this rationale to public and private housing for the elderly. See 58 App. Div.
2d at 590, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
13 See, e.g., Point Pleasant, N.J., Code, ch. 109-54, § 20 (1969), which provides:
The occupancy for a Senior Citizen Project shall be limited to persons who are fifty-
five (55) years of age or over, with the following exceptions:
(a) A husband or wife under the age of fifty-five (55) years who is residing with
his or her spouse, who is of the age of fifty-five (55) years of age or over.
(b) Children residing with their parent or parents when one (1) of said parents
with whom the child or children are residing is fifty-five (55) years of age or
over. . ..
, See, e.g., notes 11 & 83 supra.
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reasonably expect that two members of a three-member household will be
considerably younger than the minimum age prescribed by the ordinance.
Thus, a locality defending such an ordinance may not properly contend
that the essential flavor and legislative purpose underlying such an enact-
ment will be undermined if certain youthful relatives of the senior citizen
are permitted to reside in the zoned area. It is therefore likely that senior
citizen zoning laws cannot withstand the most searching kind of judicial
scrutiny often exacted in cases involving fundamental family rights.
Furthermore, even if the states have a compelling interest in the crea-
tion of areas zoned exclusively for the use of senior citizens, less intrusive
means are available to ensure that senior citizen housing benefits the eld-
erly. In order to promote the use of zoned units by the elderly a municipal-
ity may provide that the age of the nominal owner or tenant must exceed
the minimum requirement for admission to the development. Addition-
ally, the ordinance should require that the senior citizen actually reside
within the dwelling or housekeeping unit, to ensure that the elderly are not
used as "fronts" to obtain select housing for ineligible citizens. The tenant
or owner, however, should be free to reside with a reasonable number of
relatives of any age."' In the event of the death of a tenant, any relatives
residing in the dwelling unit should be provided a reasonable time to
vacate the premises. The estate of a deceased owner in fee should be
allowed to pass to any heirs in the normal fashion, but it is important to
note that if an eligible senior citizen does not thereafter reside on the
premises, the use thereof will not conform to the requirements of the
statute. In that case, the municipality may seek any remedy available to
it under its own code.
Under New York's enabling act, -town boards are permitted to regulate and restrict the
density of population. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 1965). See also Maldini v. Ambro,
36 N.Y.2d 481, 485 n.1, 330 N.E.2d 403, 406 n.1, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 389 n.1 (1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1975) (importance of population composition in town planning). Typi-
cally, senior citizen ordinances limit the maximum number of persons who may occupy a
residential unit. The ordinance challenged in Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. &
Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976), which is typical of senior citizen ordinances,
provided:
The permanent residents of a Senior Citizen Community shall be confined to persons
who are 52 years of age or over except that one child who is 19 years of age or over
may be permitted to reside in any senior citizen dwelling unit occupied by his or her
parent(s) or guardian(s). Full time occupancy of any residential unit shall be limited
to 3 individuals.
Id. at 234, 364 A.2d at 1008. It would pose no difficulty in draftsmanship for an ordinance to
provide that any relatives of any age may be permitted to reside in a dwelling unit, with a
maximum number determined in relationship to objective criteria, e.g., the floor area of the
dwelling unit. See also Molino v. City of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1971) (town may not limit apartment sizes to exclude families with children).
It is possible also to limit the number of bedrooms per apartment in order to check overcrowd-
ing. See Bailey v. Board of Appeals, 345 N.E.2d 367 (Mass 1976).
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As demonstrated by the foregoing suggestions, alternatives to the
practice of relegating senior citizens to narrowly defined housing patterns
do exist.86 Courts and municipal planners will therefore be forced to resolve
the conflict between the special physical requirements of the elderly, the
interest of the states in providing suitable housing for senior citizens, and
the need of the elderly to maintain family relationships. 7
CONCLUSION
Under the standard of review promulgated in Moore, it is unclear
whether the state need demonstrate the existence of a compelling interest
to justify the interference in family life occasioned by senior citizen zoning.
As a result, the typical senior citizen zoning ordinance may withstand
challenge on substantive due process grounds. Should courts apply a more
stringent standard of review in evaluating a substantive due process chal-
lenge, however, senior citizen zoning ordinances may fall. The Supreme
Court has ruled that states are empowered to promulgate laws and rules
strengthening family life, 8 and that this power extends to zoning. 9 The
1S Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 506 (1977) (city may not standardize its
families by forcing them to live in narrowly defined patterns); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (state may not standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction exclusively from public school teachers).
17 In a study of the elderly's dissatisfaction with their housing, it was noted that about 60%
of elderly citizens preferred younger neighbors, while only about 25% preferred retired neigh-
bors. See I. Rosow, SociAL INTEGRATION OF THE AGED 337 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL
INTEGRATION]. Less than half of the sampled group found retirement neighborhoods accepta-
ble, and about 25% "dissociate[d] themselves most vehemently from the idea of living in a
retirement neighborhood .... " Id. Nevertheless, the most important finding of the study
was that "[housing dissatisfaction is primarily a manifestation of an income problem." Id.
at 334 (emphasis in original).
Residents of retirement communities do, however, "show a high degree of satisfaction
with the retirement community concept and their own life-style in these communities ....
D. RICHARDSON, THE IMPACT OF RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES-SuMMARY REPORT 39 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as SUMMARY REPORT]. Negative factors mentioned by residents, while not
common, did include lonesomeness, lack of youthful neighbors, and regimentation. Id. at 42
(12-29% of the sample group expressing dissatisfaction). It is interesting to note that the
Rosow study found that while only 8% of the sample group expressed housing complaints,
19-37% complained about health, money, loneliness or feeling bored and useless. SOCIAL
INTEGRATION, supra, at 334. A comparison of these figures appear to reinforce the conclusion
that "[glerontologists, housers and practitioners may generally overemphasize the import-
ance of housing problems for older people." Id. at 333.
It is indisputable, however, that retirement communities have a strong impact on the
larger community of which it is a part. See SUMMARY REPORT, supra, at 6. A great strain is
placed on existing health and medical facilities, police, id. at 25, and educational systems,
id. at 31. "School officials at the local and county level have publicly cited retirees as the
cause for school budget defeats and analysis of voting returns demonstrate a strong negative
vote is cast by retirees in general." Id. The author concludes that "[w]ith a larger influx of
age-segregated residents, attitudes, belief and behavior in small, established communities
will be affected." Id. at 38.
See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971) (Louisiana intestacy law precluding inheri-
tance by illegitimate children in certain instances held valid).
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Court has yet to hold, however, that zoning laws directly impinging on
family rights may be upheld absent a showing of a compelling governmen-
tal interest. Indeed, the trend of recent decisions indicates that family
rights may not be vitiated by legislative action."
The Weymouth court, in expressing its approval of a senior citizen
ordinance, stated: "the fact that children may have moved away some-
times causes elderly persons to seek an age-homogeneous environment to
replace broken family ties."'" It is therefore ironic that localities, in order
to benefit the elderly, have chosen a method which may contribute to the
disintegration of family life.
" See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
" See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
31 71 N.J. at 270, 354 A.2d at 1027.
